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Hashcat is a popular password cracker and designed to break even the most complex passwords representation. To do this, it enables the cracking of a specific password in multiple ways, combined with versatility and speed.
Hashcat turns readable data into a garbled state (this is a random string of fixed-length size). Hashes do not allow someone to decrypt data with a specific key, as standard encryption protocols allow. Hashcat uses precomputed dictionaries, rainbow tables and even brute-force approaches to find an effective and efficient way to crack passwords.
The simplest way to crack a hash is to try first to guess the password. Each attempt is hashed and then is compared to the actual hashed value to see if they are the same, but the process can take a long time.
Dictionary and brute-force attacks are the most common ways of guessing passwords. These techniques make use of a file that contains words, phrases, common passwords and other strings that are likely to be used as a viable password.
dc647eb65e6711e155375218212b3964:Passwordeb61eead90e3b899c6bcbe27ac581660:HELLO75b71aa6842e450f12aca00fdf54c51d:P455w0rd2c9341ca4cf3d87b9e4eb905d6a3ec45:Test1234958152288f2d2303ae045cffc43a02cd:MYSECRETThese passwords are weak, and it does not take much effort or time to crack them. It is important to note that the simpler the password is, the easier it will be to detect.
Additionally, there are some GUI that makes hashcat easy to use. Hashview is one of the projects. This is a tool for security professionals to help organize and automate the repetitious tasks related to password cracking. In detail, it is a web application that manages Hashcat commands.
As most penetration testers know, the easiest way into most network devices is through default passwords. BMCs are no different, and the table below shows the default username and password combinations for the most popular BMC brands sold today. Note that only HP randomizes the password during the manufacturing process.
Dan Farmer identified a serious failing of the IPMI 2.0 specification, namely that cipher type 0, an indicator that the client wants to use clear-text authentication, actually allows access with any password. Cipher 0 issues were identified in HP, Dell, and Supermicro BMCs, with the issue likely encompassing all IPMI 2.0 implementations. It is easy to identify systems that have cipher 0 enabled using the ipmi_cipher_zero module in the Metasploit Framework.
More recently, Dan Farmer identified an even bigger issue with the IPMI 2.0 specification. In short, the authentication process for IPMI 2.0 mandates that the server send a salted SHA1 or MD5 hash of the requested user's password to the client, prior to the client authenticating. You heard that right - the BMC will tell you the password hash for any valid user account you request. This password hash can broken using an offline bruteforce or dictionary attack. Since this issue is a key part of the IPMI specification, there is no easy path to fix the problem, short of isolating all BMCs into a separate network. The ipmi_dumphashes module in the Metasploit Framework can make short work of most BMCs.
In the example above, the module was able to identify two valid user accounts (root and blank), retrieve the hmac-sha1 password hashes for these accounts, and automatically crack them using an internal wordlist. If a database is connected, Metasploit will automatically store the hashed and clear-text version of these credentials for future use. If a user's password is not found in the local dictionary of common passwords, an external password cracking program can be employed to quickly brute force possible options. The example below demonstrates how to write out John the Ripper and Hashcat compatible files.
Thanks to atom, the main developer of Hashcat, version 0.46 or above now supports cracking RAKP hashes. It is worth noting that atom added support for RAKP within 2 hours of receiving the feature request! In the example below, we use hashcat with RAKP mode (7300) to brute force all four-character passwords within a few seconds.
In addition to the authentication problems above, Dan Farmer noted that many BMCs ship with "anonymous" access enabled by default. This is configured by setting the username of the first user account to a null string and setting a null password to match. The ipmi_dumphashes module will identify and dump the password hashes (including blank passwords) for null user accounts. This account can be difficult to use on its own, but we can leverage ipmitool to reset the password of a named user account and leverage that account for access to other services.
The IPMI 2.0 specification mandates that the BMC respond to HMAC-based authentication methods such as SHA1 and MD5. This authentication process has some serious weaknesses, as demonstrated in previous examples, but also requires access to the clear-text password in order to calculate the authentication hash. This means that the BMC must store a clear-text version of all configured user passwords somewhere in non-volatile storage. In the case of Supermicro, this location changes between firmware versions, but is either /nv/PSBlock or /nv/PSStore. The passwords are scattered between various binary blobs, but easy to pick out as they always follow the username. This is a serious issue for any organization that uses shared passwords between BMCs or even different types of devices.
The issues covered in this post were uncovered in a relatively short amount of time and have barely scratched the surface of possibilities. In addition to vulnerabilities in the IPMI protocol itself, most BMCs seem to suffer from issues common across all embedded devices, namely default passwords, outdated open source software, and, in some cases, backdoor accounts and static encryption keys. The world of BMCs is a mess that is not likely to get better anytime soon, and we need to be crystal clear about the risk these devices pose to our networks.
Cisco routers have three methods of representing passwords in the configuration file. From weakest to strongest, they include clear text, Vigenere encryption, and MD5 hash algorithm. Clear-text passwords are represented in human-readable format. Both the Vigenere and MD5 encryption methods obscure passwords, but each has its own strengths and weaknesses.
The main difference between Vigenere and MD5 is that Vigenere is reversible, while MD5 is not. Being reversible makes it easier for an attacker to break the encryption and obtain the passwords. Being unreversible means that an attacker must use much slower brute force guessing attacks in an attempt to obtain the passwords.
The first method of encryption that Cisco provides is through the command service password-encryption. This command obscures all clear-text passwords in the configuration using a Vigenere cipher. You enable this feature from global configuration mode.
The last password looks random and was still not cracked when the password cracker stopped running three days later. The problem is remembering a password like this one. See the upcoming sidebar, Choosing and Remembering Strong Passwords for tips on choosing an appropriate password.
Except for the enable secret password, all passwords stored on Cisco routers are weakly encrypted. If someone were to get a copy of a router configuration file, it would take only a few seconds to run it through a program to decode all weakly encrypted passwords. The first protection is to keep the configuration files secured.
Encryption on an insecure system, however, provides a false sense of security. If attackers can break into the insecure system, they can set up a key logger and capture everything that is typed on that system. This includes the passwords to decrypt the configuration files. In this case, an attacker just has to wait until the administrator types in the password, and your encryption is compromised.
Notice that a password is required to gain more access; no password is required when lowering your level of access. The router requires reauthentication every time you attempt to gain more privileges, but nothing is needed to give up privileges.
To use the enable command to access a privilege level, a password must be set for that level. If you try to enter a level with no password, you get the error message No password set. Setting privilege-level passwords can be done with the enable secret level command. The following example enables and sets a password for privilege level 5: 2ff7e9595c
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